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‘The status quo is an option for partial
participation in reforms. One wonders if it
stands any chance at this juncture?’ (Randhawa,
1994, p361)
‘Rosencrantz: Take you me for a spunge my
lord? Hamlet: Ay, sir; that soaks up the king’s
countenance, his rewards, his authorities. But
such officers do the king best service in the end;
he keeps them like an ape doth nuts, in the
corner of his jaw; first mouthed, to be last
swallowed ; when he needs what you have
gleaned, it is but squeezing you, and, spunge,
you shall be dry again. Ros: I understand you not
my lord.’ (William Shakespeare,Hamlet, Act IV;
Sc II)
What is Policy?
In India, despite the appearance in the early 1990s of comprehensive proposals for the
liberalisation of India’s agricultural sector, 
1 the status quo has shown remarkable resistance.
This paper seeks  reasons in the process of development policy for the considerable ‘chance’
agricultural policy has had - for good or ill - throughout the last decade of the 20th century. 
The study of development policy suffers acutely from the fact that so much is excluded from
theories of development whose raison d’etre would seem to be their presumed policy
relevance. ‘Policy’ is missing from the indexes of most major textbooks on development,
development theories and the politics of development. 
2 While the OED defines policy as ‘the
course of action adopted by government’ to achieve certain objectives (my italics), in
economics  policy is commonly presented and understood as meaning the course of action
that ought to follow, based on the results of hypothesis-testing or a set of deductions from
economic theory. In rational choice discourse, policy is seen as the product of social interests;
and in Foucauldian analysis development agencies generate discourse creating in turn a
structure of knowledge which, while failing in its own terms, has effects including the
entrenchment of bureaucratic power and the denial of politics. 
3 In the case of economics,
policy is seen in terms of  ‘implications’ - and neither the character of the state nor the
operating costs of the policy implications are usually considered. In rational choice theory, the
metaphors of policy as a ‘commodity’, of lobbies as ‘interests’ or ‘purchasers’, and of votes
as ‘currency’ are abstracted from any history  - and the history of the evolution of the deep
social forces shaping the volatile ‘epiphenomena’ of policy is outside the frame.
4 In post-
modern deconstruction, Ferguson’s conclusion that ‘development’ is an ‘anti-politics
machine’is more realistic, yet while he points out that  development policy threatens domestic
political mobilisation by depoliticising what it contacts, he nevertheless avoids the question
of the very real resources and politics generated by development policy itself, forces which
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Mainstream understanding of the policy process is instrumentalist and positivist. Policy is a
rational activity carried out by technical experts in and out of the state, not necessarily neutral
but using objective methods in a transparent way.
5 Problems are identified, generally  as
deficits; their scope is sectoralised; data are organised for a process of dispassionate
consideration; a selection known as policy-making takes place;  decisions are made known;
thereafter  ‘other and different (non policy) things , known as implementation occur’.  
6 At
best, but rather rarely, monitoring and evaluation complete a feedback loop and as is all too
well known, when evaluated against statements of intention, policy is almost always
unsuccessful. Obstacles - either ‘in society’ or of ‘political will’ - then serve as scapegoats
which enable failed policies to be replicated or the responsibilities of officials to be avoided.
 Policy and politics are distinguished in English, enabling the depoliticisation of policy. As a
result, crucial factors shaping the mobilisation and allocation of public sector resources are
excluded from consideration. If  policy ‘is what it does’, it has to be recognised that the entire
process bristles with politics. The  question is what sort. Unless this is asked, the history of
policy will be banal and misleading. Commonly the scope of policy reform is exaggerated by
experts, in their ‘exemplary positions’ of authority. 
7 Opposition, if considered at all in
development economics, is conceived of as the cause of the economic costs of suboptimal
decision making, (the ‘lack of political will’). Paradoxes in which intended beneficiaries of a
policy become its victims (and vice versa) when the policy is implemented  - or in which the
costs of the ineligible but included (E errors) are deplored while those of the eligible but
excluded (F errors) get neglected  - then become routine. The suppression of the fact that
policy is messy is itself part of the ways in which those with a stake in ‘policy technique’
defend their vested interests.
The most useful general framework for teasing out the constellation of power relations
generated by development policy remains Schaffer’s (1984), though his credo does not make
light reading. Simplifying and developing Schaffer, we see that the policy process involves
four kinds of overlapping politics. They may be separated for the purpose of analysis but in
practice they operate simultaneously. The first is that of agenda : the power relations involved
in the creation, negotiation and ordering of sets of themes about which statements of intention
are made. The second is that of the translation of policy discourse into procedure : the
enacting and internalising of laws and informal rules of procedure and of access. The third is
the power relations by means of  which public resources are raised and allocated, tax is
resisted and expenditure challenged. The fourth is the politics of access to bureaucratically
distributed goods.
8 In the whole set of  processes, party politics and bureaucratic politics are
meshed with the politics of social institutions and material interests, and the neat boundary
between state and society is blurred.
9
It is through the politics of agenda-setting that issues are labelled, are contested and ranked.
In the analysis of policy not only is this kind of politics uniquely privileged (as though the rest
did not exist), it is commonly reduced to a ‘distanced’ technical sphere - one occupied
increasingly by experts in international banks and their client aid agencies and by client
academics, consultancy firms and local technical advisory cells. It is carried out in a lingua
franca of markets, profit, efficiency and conditionality, and with the use of advanced
statistics. Hamlet’s ‘spunges’ may be found here. Evidence expressed in any other
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Bank sometimes does, it is published as a device to distract attention  from the real business
of banking). In practice however, many other interests with different and unequal powers are
pitted together in agenda-setting. There are of course individual bureaucrats interested in the
perpetuation of their jobs, whatever the character of the state employing them, be it
independent/developmental or rentier/predatory. The interests of collective, departmental or
part-privatised quango and public corporative bodies come into contention, as do structures of
patronage and social networks (ethnic, religious, regional, gendered) operating inside the
state. Then there are the  media, in which certain kinds of evidence dismissed by technical
experts may be considered valid and important (for instance particular individual cases) and
where other kinds of evidence are neglected or censored. 
10 In electoral democracies such as
India’s, political parties are arenas in which ideas about policy can seethe creatively, although
the individual politician in a given party may be ignorant of development policies or
understand his or her party’s position on specific issues in ways that flatly contradict the
understanding of other party members. 
11 There may be party-coalitions in government and
opposition in which matters which are low on the agendas of individual parties shoot upwards
as a result of their significance in consensus-making. Agendas  are also shaped by organised
national and international lobbies representing material interests (trades unions, family
businesses, corporations, banks, ‘farmers’: supplicants, threateners, smooth suppliers of the
members of advisory committees and councils, openly or secretively active inside government
departments) for which the politics of agenda are important only in so far as they can be used
to mask the competition over the creation and protection of rents that is taking place
elsewhere. There are civil society institutions, NGOs and social  movements which work on
agendas, sometimes without any material interest but deploying information and persuasion
(‘advocacy’). And so on. 
Inside and outside the state, in struggles around the agenda,  development is sectoralised (for
example nutrition policy excludes food policy let alone alcohol policy). People are  labelled
(as ‘pregnant and lactating mothers’, ‘small farmers’, ‘BPLs’ (people below the poverty line),
the micro-creditworthy, ‘SC/ST’ (those eligible for positive discimination) etc) although in
reality people may belong to several such categories. 
12 Some of these labels set people up as
targets, making them doubly objectified. By these means some people are excluded, rejected,
silenced and made invisible, while forces entirely outside a given agenda, or excluded from it
in the process of sectoralising, may determine policy priorities. But equally these labels create
categories around which those so labelled may develop their own political mobilisation.
Technique may not always triumph; decisions may never be formalised; most crucially of all,
stated intention may never be taken at face value.
In the process of proceduralisation (the means whereby a policy objective is operationalised), 
components of the  agenda  - scholarly papers, policy notes, manifestoes, project appraisals,
plans, etc -  are translated into patterned behaviour through legislation, departmental orders
and informal procedural norms, which are supposed to be enforced. But sometimes breaking
the rules is rewarded (as in public sector food storage and processing where outdated
technologies are specified but performance is improved by ignoring the rules; or as in the
rules of spacing between wells to be supplied with electricity for water-pumping, thereby
penalising late comers who privately reward those who fix the connection). Procedure is the
least visible arena policy. Two kinds of politics matter here. One is when discrepancies are
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slippage which may be accidental, but often is not. As a result, procedure may embody
internal contradictions and inconsistencies and become more and more inconsistent as
amendments are made over time, or as officials change posts and newcomers interpret the
rules differently. Formal procedures may even prevent implementation altogether (for
example, the international convention on freedom from hunger where it has not yet been
possible to codify ‘hunger’). 
13  More than one form of procedure often co-exist
14 and the very 
idea of what procedure involves may mutate inside bureaucracies or in civil society.  
In the second kind of politics, procedure is a resource to be captured: the administration of
procedure is a  ‘field of power’. Its social composition is protected. 
15 In legally plural
societies like India’s for example, combinations of parts of different legal systems may be
opportunistically deployed. Judgements of breaches of procedure come into conflict, as a
result of which there are further discrepancies between procedural norms and actual practice.
Informal systems of regulation and sanction develop in response. The Essential Commodities
Act is a case in point, with 59 amendments, highly varied local understandings of its scope,
informalised implementation and socially codified norms of corruption. 
16  
Most policy analysis also pays scant attention to the third set of political forces shaping the
policy process, except in the technical fields of public finance and corruption theory. These
are the power relations shaping the mobilisation of resources for the implementation of
policy.  Of course, resource mobilisation through taxation, loans and grants of aid is riddled
with options and subject to the other kinds of politics too. The seasonality and timing of
revenue flows, and the social composition of the forces resisting and those complying results
in patterns in the supply of tax revenue are the truest reflection of  the structure of social
accountability. Fiscal resources pour into a convection system to be allocated between current
and capital expenditure, between departments and projects, between sectors and subsidies,
centre and states. The seeming deadweight of past patterns of allocation should not blind us to
the fact that political forces keep these allocations in place. They also determine the extent to
which individual departments are co-ordinated; for every department of government has a role
in the regulation of markets and most have a role in the development of agriculture. And what
has been said here about financial resources applies equally to the recruitment and allocation
of officials.
The fourth aspect of policy concerns the power relations through which rules of access are
enforced and challenged : those of the ‘counter’ ( how many points of distribution or
registration are there? When are they active? Where are they located and with what
implications? What are the volumes of administered goods and services flowing over them?);
eligibility ( who qualifies? Who is excluded? Who decides?); queues and their discipline
(among those who qualify who  gets the goods and services? In what order?); voice (who
(eligible or non-eligible) can intermediate or manipulate the rules of access to their own
advantage?); and  exit 
17 (who drops out? Who does not benefit? Who finds ways other than
those ruled in order to obtain the benefit to which they are entitled?). In accounts of access to
bureaucratically-distributed goods and services, people are frequently  referred to as
‘beneficiaries’ or ‘targets’. They are passive recipients.  Of late ‘participation’ has  been
popularised with a view to incorporating beneficiaries actively into the process of access, and
to a very limited extent into allocation. 
18 (It has also become an end in itself.) How far
‘participation’ has really changed the power relations of access is so far almost unknown.QEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS78 Page 6
These ‘complex systems of power ....codify social norms and values, and articulate
fundamental organising principles of society, they also contain implicit  (and sometimes
explicit) models of society’ (Shore and Wright, 1997, p6-7). These help to pattern and
constitute the spheres of collective and individual action - and ‘freedom’. In this sense, as S.
Guhan put it, the state is a road roller rather than a sports car. Allocations are not the only
aspect of the policy process that are characterised by deadweight. ‘Terms of art’ (and their
acronyms) are created and become imbued with very specific and exclusive meanings (take
for example ‘safety net’, ‘TRYSEM’, ‘social exclusion’, ‘gender and development
(GAD)’,‘the environment’ even ‘the reform period’). These special meanings are understood
in development agencies; they structure what is researched, taught and debated in universities
and research institutions. Routines also persist, even when leached of their original purpose
(e.g., often, ‘participation’). Resources (money and postings) come to be ‘dedicated’ and
terms of inclusion seemingly settled for ever (be it for ‘nominee directors’, ‘pregnant and
lactating women’, ‘informal livelihoods’, ‘small scale industry’, ‘desert development’, let
alone for Hamlet’s ‘spunges’ and ‘nuts’ who hang around in management consultancies and
bureaucracies and wait upon politicians to this day). 
In the light of these reflections, not only is policy revealed in its intrinsic complexity (and
orthodox notions in their politically selective simplicity), but the process of implementation is
also seen to transform policy utterance ‘out of all recognition’. 
19  These transformed relations
of authority then actively conceal developmental possibilities - among them the possibility of
the social  regulation of markets in the mass interest, of the collective provision of ‘equity’
and of the operationalisation of rights, all of  which were given a mandate in India’s
Constitution.
20
The problem with the realisation that  policy must be understood in terms of complex layers
of politics is that to analyse them is then such an ambitious undertaking that it has never been
attempted in its entirety. For a start it is necessary to stand outside the knowledge structure
and the constituent disciplines created for development in order to perceive the power
relations masked by its discourse. But  the language in which one carries out the operation is
inevitably part of this structure of knowledge. This analysis also calls for evidence  to be
found in many different places, evidence requiring expert interpretation (for example, the
cost-benefit and welfare economics paradigms or legal texts) as well as evidence from verbal
accounts, not excluding anecdotes and rumour, which is extremely hard to collect and is
considered of doubtful legitimacy in social science; 
21 Schaffer himself observed that ‘(s)uch
data is decentralised, humble and dirty’.  The collection of such evidence calls for the
participant observation of an anthropologist, the critical methods of the historian and the
professional expertise of economists, political scientists and lawyers, and its analysis requires
efforts of deconstruction. No single scholar has these skills. No discipline encourages their
development. However if the analysis of policy is not to connive with one small part of the
process (that of technique) to the exclusion of all the rest of it (which continues to shape the
policy process, despite our ignoring it and whatever our judgment of its desirability), then we
somehow have to make the attempt. 
22 
In India, policy for both agricultural production and social welfare is the responsibility of
constituent states. However, both the Planning Commission and the central government
Ministries in New Delhi influence state agendas, resource mobilisation and allocation andQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS78 Page 7
access; and their politics  -  operating at different scales - may involve different agendas,
procedure, resources and rules of access.
23  While different, they are not separate. The
composite nature of the agenda, the regulative framework and the sources of funding may
itself become a resource in the competition over surplus that lies  at the heart of 
development. For brevity’s sake we confine the argument to agriculture; within agriculture, 
to its agenda, to the origins of its agenda and to their politics.
The Composite Agricultural Agenda and its Significance for Development
Already by the mid nineties, there were two worked-out policy packages for agriculture with
material resources to back them. One, the liberalisation paradigm, had and still has a highly
influential reach. This was the paradigm being debated by administrators and scholars alike in
Washington, London, New Delhi and Madras/Chennai, as though there were no other kind of
agricultural policy. It is the one taught to students all over the world. The other paradigm,
discovered much later through interviews with local agricultural officials in Tamil Nadu state, 
is grounded in the science-based paradigms of the local state bureaucracy and the politics of
patronage. By 2001 however, there were at the very least three paradigms. 
24 At the risk of
some arbitrary simplification, the assumption of just three policy packages still helps us
understand the role of agenda in the politics of agricultural policy and the role of composite,
interlocking agendas in the politics of reform.
Fast Track Liberalisation : We start out from the justified and critical statement on policy
options for economic liberalisation made from N.S. Randhawa’s review of papers to the New
Delhi Conference on ‘Agricultural Policy in the New Economic Environment’ sponsored by
FAO and held in September 1993, just as our own fieldwork was starting.
25 ‘To be phased
over 3 to 4 years’, the controls over the agricultural sector needed to be  eliminated so as to
enable markets to function efficiently and to eliminate the economic distortions caused for
reasons of private interest by bureaucrats and politicians. At least 20 major agricultural
commodities would be involved, notably foodgrains (whose domestic prices would rise to the
level of world markets), together with oilseeds and sugar should the OECD countries fulfill
their treaty obligations under the GATT and reduce their agricultural protection. For India,
this was an agenda for the deregulation of commodity and factor markets. It involved the
elimination of movement restrictions, the unbiased operation of freight transport, the
privatisation of storage, the deregulation of agro-processing from its special (protected or
restricted) status as a ‘small scale industry’, the dismantling of subsidies on fertiliser and
electricity, with increased exports compensating for the production disincentives resulting
from the price squeeze from raised costs of production. It involved either dismantling or
privatising most of  the activities of the public distribution system, the liberalisation of the
land market  - starting with land lease deregulation  - and permission for corporate investment
in ‘wasteland’ and degraded forest. 
The fast track agenda was far from being a policy for wholesale privatisation. The conception
of public goods and services embodied in fast track policy required investment in port
infrastructure for agricultural exports and imports, irrigation infrastructure in the deprived
regions of the north-east and east, research and development for the crops of these regions,
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foodgrains and, more controversially, the protection of targeted and subsidised credit for
small-scale agricultural production.
The people who made this input into the agricultural policy agenda, being migrant global
technocrats and national economic policy elites, were and are able to impose conditions on
international loans.
26 Their criteria were based on benefit-cost paradigms and a disembedded
conception of efficiency. The discourse was (macro)economic, with the consequence that
institutional change was conceived as ‘engineerable’  -  and indeed friction-free. Since then,
ongoing debate has concerned means or instruments, rather than principles. What is excluded
is significant. There is practically no concern for the agro-ecological environment and the
only concern expressed concerning  the mass of small producers and labourers in agriculture
is that they are a  threat to the smooth running of the new policies, and to be assuaged with a
safety net . Markets are assumed to operate neutrally with respect to society. This agenda is
thus crudely  ‘anti-politics’ both  in the sense of not arising from party politics or being
associated with any single party, and in the sense that it depoliticises development by its
discourse. Indeed, it is openly said by economists to ‘remove politics from the economy’.
Creative Globalisation : Here the key text is the report of , and comments on, a detailed
interview with the agricultural scientist, M.S.Swaminathan, under whose charge HYV seeds
were introduced to India. He is an ex Secretary of Agriculture to the Government of India and
ex Director of the International Rice Research Institute in the Philippines, who now directs in
Chennai a state-of-the-art, private  agricultural research institute named after him. 
27 
The globalised agricultural trade and investment regime has provoked a new agricultural
agenda. Three policies have particular urgency. The first results from  the establishment of the
World Trade Organisation in 1994 which regulates, inter alia, global agricultural trade.
Compliance with its rules has been unbalanced : it has been forced on developing countries
but resisted by the OECD block. For OECD countries, formal exceptions have been created,
by the mechanism of  policy ‘boxes’, to protect incomes and even raise the level of farm
support. There needs to be a counterpart ‘Livelihood Box’ - a set of quantitative restrictions
on imports for countries like India in cases threatening  the mass of agricultural livelihoods.
The second policy proposal results from the proprietary control of the biosphere where
international procedure is both inappropriate and inconsistent. Trade Related Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS) are already at variance with the legally binding provisions of the
International Convention on Biological Diversity (their global signatories coming from
different domestic Ministries). There needs to be protection for the rights of Indian farmers to
retain seed between seasons and to protect new varieties developed by themselves. Third, the
genetic modification (GM) of agricultural products poses two further kinds of currently
unresolvable policy problems. The first is the relation between GM crops and the
environment. On the one hand GM crops may constitute a technical solution to  production in
agronomic environments (notably saline and dry land) for which policies of conventional
biotechnological change have had little success. On the other hand GM crops are certain to be
biochemically unstable, to create gene pollution and to risk unpredictable and irreversible
environmental impacts. The second problem is the relation between the control and goals of
GM science and the material practices and outcomes acually associated with it. Although
publicly-funded research will always be ‘distorted’ (meaning it will be moulded by the
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factor scarcities), it may nonetheless have some social goals and long time horizons, whereas
privately funded research is first and last for profit and dividends. There is an urgent need for
a National Commission on Genetic Modification.
Policy makers engaging critically with agricultural globalisation are drawn from the
agricultural science elite in state-funded research institutions and the scientific civil service,
from NGOs and social movements and certain political parties. 
28 Their positions and
priorities range from a resistance to global capital on both the right and left (based variously
on nationalism, socialism or participative forms of democracy) to a concern for mass
livelihoods and/or the environment. All aspects of this agenda presuppose a strong domestic
regulative role for a state that is strong enough in turn to alter the global rules for agro-capital.
By contrast, the redistributive aspects of this agenda, concerned with decentralisation and
participation, express  contradictory forms of anti-state populism. The language of efficiency
is not paramount but the concept of appropriate production is. This agenda is still being
intensely debated and risks at best shutting the stable door long after the horse has bolted. In
that case, regulation will lag far behind events.
Tamil Nadu’s Agricultural Policy Agenda - the Garden : Here we start out from the four
Annual Policy Notes and data on Agricultural Department expenditure published under the
names of the State Agricultural Ministers K.P.Krishnan and V.S. Arumugham from 1994 to
1997 during a change of ruling party, backed up by the Budget Speeches for this period. 
29 It
exemplifies non-metropolitan agricultural development policy.
Tamil Nadu’s agenda in the early reform period shows a substantial degree of autonomy, as
does its defence of the scope and price parameters of the public distribution system and noon
meal scheme. Since it is so different, both from the liberalisation agenda and from textbook
agricultural policy, 
30  we will consider this agenda at greater length. Tamil Nadu’s stated
policies for agriculture are as follows:
i) environmental protection, focussing on wastelands, soil conservation and watershed
development; 
ii) sustainability (organic farming, biofertiliser development, integrated pests management,
bioconversion of agricultural and urban waste);
iii) improved water management at the micro-scale , using a variety of participative,
collective and (semi) state institutions and scientific techniques;
iv) ‘scientific implements’ for agricultural production;
v) seed patenting for biodiversity, focussing on horticulture, oil palm etc;
vi) diversification in production : an active role for the state via demonstration plots and
extension in horticulture, sericulture, dairying , poultry and fisheries;
vii) logistical, technical and financial support to increase exprts, particularly of horticultural
and floricultural products with upstream production linkages to agro-processing plants;
viii) increased vegetable production;
ix) 'reasonable’ prices regulated through the streamlining of marketing infrastructure
(extension staff are to shed their inputs-trading activities but agricultural wholesale Regulated
Market Committees are to expand the pledge-loan facility based on produce stored on
regulated market sites; continued effort to be made to systematise quality grades across a wide
range of products (a necessary precondition for long-distance trade)) andQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS78 Page 10
x) the creation of new forms of active economic management (direct trading by the
agriculture department to be hived off to state corporations; new parastatal trading agencies
and seed inspectorates for plantation crops to be created; new laws regulating horticulture to
be passed).
This agenda is advanced by politicians and administrators and expressed in a combination of
science-derived and triumphalist language greatly at variance with that of fast track
liberalisation. The territorial state is envisioned as a very large garden. A highly active
political state is unavoidably engaged in  creating the collective preconditions for the
‘gardeners’ to go to market and in reducing the unequal terms of bargaining they can expect
once they get there. Table 1 shows that throughout the period of heavy pressure to cut public
expenditure, capital and current expenditure by the Agriculture Department exceeded
estimates.
31  Expenditure was on an expansion path and attempts to contain it failed.
Much is made of ecological diversity which implicitly justifies modes of procedure and
allocation which work through a mass of projects and micro-schemes. Their description uses
a language of decentralisation, scientific technique  and specificity. Huge emphasis is also
placed on the category of ‘small farmers’, with contradictory mixes of individual incentives
and rewards (packages of high-tech and green-tech inputs (see Table 2)) and of collective
action to enhance economies of scale.
32  Entire districts are selected for special attention, for
crop-specific projects, wasteland cultivation, soil conservation or watershed development;
immense possibilities for patronage are generated by configuring agricultural policy in this
way. At the same time, the proliferation of small schemes for small producers depends in part
on the political interests of project funders from outside India. The agendas and resources of
aid agencies have a direct influence upon the state government : the FAO trains farmers in
‘biocontrol’; the World Bank trains district level planners in planning and agricultural
professionals in IT; DANIDA develops the skills of agricultural women and encourages
watershed development; SIDA dynamises agro-forestry and dryland agriculture while the
Government of Israel helps to transfer technology for high value crops. The state’s capacity to
absorb these project funds is saturated. Year by year the policy notes record incomplete
uptake and delays. Ecological diversity, external project funding and a politics of patronage
are mutually reinforcing here. The result  is a striking inertia in both discourse and resource
allocation.
Over precisely the kind of time span in which the fast track liberalisers expected deregulation
to penetrate the entire economy, the Tamil Nadu Agriculture Department showed how little it
needed to change. At the margins in fact, a populist  form of agricultural patronage was
exchanged for corporate patronage in 1996 when Jayalalitha’s AIADMK regime was replaced
by Karunanidhi’s DMK. Grants for temple gardens and for  the beautification of the Ooty lake
for film sets; and prizes to exemplary extension officers and farmers, were suddenly stopped.
33 Instead new resources were made available to subsidise corporate capital to develop
wastelands for floriculture and undertake joint ventures in agro-processing. Infrastructure for
agro-processing and specialised physical market sites (for jaggery, for flowers) was promised,
along with subsidised transport for farmers.
34 Above all, the state agenda expresses
continuity, complexity and expansion. It reflects solid bureaucratic interests, a nexus
structured around patronage and the application of scientific techniques, together with the
needs of  a diverse but powerful political constituency. 
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Major parts of the agricultural economy are strikingly marginalised on this agenda. The
foodgrains economy of  rice and groundnuts, in which a state with fabled grain bowls has lost
rank and where growth has faltered,  
36 are not the central concerns of local agricultural
policy.
Indeed it is now obvious not simply that the local policy agenda is different from the one we
researched but also that the main policies affecting agriculture are not administered through
the agriculture department. They are administered through a range of other departments
(Public Works for road and irrigation infrastructure; Food and Civil Supplies for food;
Industry for fertiliser; Social Welfare for labour; Co-operatives and Finance for credit) and
parastatal corporations (Electricity Boards; the All-India Food Corporation and the State Civil
Supplies Corporation for food; Cotton Corporation, Storage and Warehouse Corporation etc).
The regulation of agrarian markets is administered through combinations of state and central
government departments and corporations. Most of  these departments and corporations are
also doing non-agricultural things. As a result, the priorities of the agricultural agenda and the
ranking of agricultural policy as a whole in the priorities of each institution implementing
agricultural policy will be quite specific. In implementation as well as in theory, agricultural
policy will be affected by non-agricultural policy. Agricultural policy (as is the case with
other kinds of policy 
37) is also supported by with non-agricultural justifications. A new
parastatal for agro-engineering services is justified not only for agriculture but also as a
component in the state’s policy to give livelihoods to unemployed engineers. The state does
not simply - and conventionally - sectoralise agriculture. It splits agriculture up into micro
sectors and distributes it across almost all formal institutions of government. Only in the year
2000 did bureaucratic co-ordination appear in the state’s agricultural policy notes. 
38  No
acknowledgement of the  idiosyncracy of what is labelled agricultural has ever appeared
there. 
Although three quite separate policy agendas can be discerned, each with their histories - fast
track liberalisation, creative globalisation and Tamil Nadu’s garden programme -  all of them
intertwine not just because they co-exist in time but also because of overlapping institutions
and interests. Although far from exhaustive, our description of them is detailed enough to
show the influence of  agricultural research on the  idioms of both the global and the state
agenda, and of economics on liberalisation and globalisation policy. Both the global and state
agendas are also characterised by a paternalistic populism. The interests of international aid
agencies pervade all three agendas, financial aid in the first case, social movements in the
second, and bi- and multi-lateral development agencies in the third. While the global and state
agendas each embody contradictory positions on capital (and by implication on labour and
petty production), the first agenda encourages capital while depoliticising it discursively.The
agendas are also at different stages of formation, that at the state being most deeply settled
while the other two are in contention. Agricultural policy vividly illustrates the dynamic
nature of this political process.
Interpretations : Agriculture is slow to be reformed. The state’s involvement in agriculture
was expanding, not contracting, in the early phase of liberalisation. By 1993-4 fertiliser had
been partially decontrolled and subsidies had been rapidly restored. Agricultural credit had
not been touched. Product prices were moving towards world market levels: the price of rice
rose while that of groundnuts sank. Movement restrictions on agricultural trade were lifted inQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS78 Page 12
1993 (but lorry drivers still had to bribe checkpost guards to let them through and Indian
railways still favoured public corporations over private trade). The structure of subsidies (on
credit, agricultural co-operatives, fertiliser, food, electricity and irrigation) was intact and
remained so throughout the period (Table 3). The redistributive operations of the Food
Corporation of India supplying the Public Distribution System was being lethargically
revamped so as to targeted areas as well as income categories. The movement of groundnuts
had not been deregulated. Local states still regulated  markets in order to enable state
procurement of a range of commodities. Agro-processing was still reserved for ‘small scale
industry’ until 2001. 
39
The low relative priority given to agricultural reform can be explained in a number of
persuasive ways. Using Bardhan’s political economy, where policy is the outcome of clashes
between three proprietary classes, the relative speed of reform is dictated by the nature of the
costs and benefits to interests in opposition to it.
40 In agriculture however states have not
acquiesced to fast track liberalisation in agriculture because of the lure of  benefits in other
economic sectors. They have not acquiesced at all.  If  we search for an explanation in terms
of class forces, we can find it in agricultural lobbies  that back resistance. But it is not only
the nexus of interests benefiting from the combination of parasitic and productive rents
derived from the partial socialisation of agriculture, it is also and crucially the indispensability
of the price structure of basic wage goods for the entire informal workforce - including people
selling foodgrains after harvest and buying some back before the next  - that is at stake. While
the capitalist class fractions expected to benefit directly from fast track reform were the agro-
capitalist elites and intermediate and corporate agri-business, these are relatively small and
dispersed interest groups compared to the might of the engineering sector which, through the
Confederation of Indian Industry, exerts heavy pressure on on policy elites and shares all but
the last digit of their postal codes.
41 Jenkins’ controversial hypothesis that successful reform
has occurred by stealth - whatever its relevance to industry - carries the powerful implication
for agriculture that since reforms touching mass livelihoods cannot under any circumstances
be stealthy, they will be delayed. 
42 Bardhan’s depiction of the Central Government ‘chipping
away’ 
43 , piecemeal, but not necessarily by stealth, had little purchase on  agricultural policy
in the nineties. Even though one sure way in which the central state has chipped away is
through reducing its subsidies to states, agricultural policy has the consistency of diamond.
This has  resulted in a ‘mere’ transfer of the financial burden, rather than a set of policy
responses. Even the argument about the need to reduce the contribution of total subsidies to
the fiscal deficit may work curiously in favour of agricultural subsidies, since they are not the
largest element. Total food and agricultural subsidies in 1993 were about 13 % of total
government subsidies while agriculture was 32% of  GDP (Table 3). Until bankruptcy
requires a response, agricultural policy looks set to resist reform.
In addition to these explanations, our analysis of the agricultural agenda reveals another
simple and obvious reason for delayed reform. This is the intrinsic complexity of agricultural
policy, the range of interests in it being multiply justified, inconsistently layered, path-
dependent and contested, operating simultaneously in many policy paradigms, involving most
departments of government, linking the jurisdictions of centre and state. Laws and office
procedure mirror this complexity and the relevant allocations of skilled manpower are also
extensive. Organising the wholesale dismantling of existing agricultural policy has simply not
been imagined. The idea must beggar belief. The policy process may be more influential inQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS78 Page 13
blocking reforms than the sheer size of subsidies. It is also an expression of the unusual
common interest of competing class forces.
Although the Indian state sector is about half the size of its western counterparts in term of its
share of GDP, it does not fail to reach villages.
44 The state permeates production and is the
only  institution of any significance engaged in redistribution.  Agricultural development turns
out to be ordered by project and by patronage as much as by price and subsidy.  Policy is a
thickly tangled skein of power through which indirect, externalised and unintended activity
influences each labelled sector. 
Lastly, it is very hard to detect what is not included in agricultural development policy. The
lowest priority on the liberalisation agenda  is assigned - in the sector of production -  to
sanitation and drinking water infrastructure, organic fertiliser, credit for land purchase by
landless producers and  wage protection . [The social welfare sector is even lower in the
ranking of policy priorities than is agricultural production, and  ranked lowest  in the scheme
of priorities of the social sector are incapacity and disability, alcohol policy and its ravages,
the life chances of girls, child labour and the condition of single person households].
45 These
exclusions are not to be regarded as definitive since the means whereby they were noticed
was not systematic - they were confronted during village fieldwork.  Unimportant
development policies involve physical dirt, manual labour, ritual pollution and age and gender
subordination. Quite how liberalisation could do anything but intensify this egregious neglect
is not at all apparent .
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Table 1: Agriculture Department Spending, Tamil Nadu (Rs crore (10 m))
1994-5 1995-6 1996-7 1997-8
Current Estimated 665 253 744 689
Revised 717 786 789 719
Capital Estimated 679 765 754
Revised 730 795 802
Source: GOTN 1995 to 1998, Policy Notes on Agriculture.
Table 2: Patronage of Small Farmers: 1995.
Heavily Subsidised on Free Provision of Rationed Goods and Services
Agricultural kits to farm women











Source: Government of Tamil Nadu, 1995.  Policy Notes on Agriculture, Madras, pp. 18-22.QEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS78 Page 15
Table 3: Agricultural and Welfare Subsidies
All-India 1993-4 Fertiliser Electricity Irrigation 
(1) Credit Food Total Ag.
+ Non-Ag.
Rs bu crores 2.7 3.5 2.6 1.8 3.0 127
Tamil Nadu Rs crores Electricity Social Security Noon Meal Food
1990-91 175.7 235.3 257.8
1991-92 4.3 255.6 332.2
1992-93 826.3 272.3 473.1
1993-94 890.2 62.4 282.5 359.0
1994-95 653.8 66.5 365.2 440.0
1995-96 354.8 85.9 356.9 800.0
Sources: Randhawa, 1994, p. 368; Bardhan, 1999, p. 147; Government of Tamil Nadu raw data. 
(1) Including the annualised cost of the book value of capital costs.
Note: Agricultural subsidies as a % of total government subsidies: 13%
Agriculture as % of total GDP (1990): 32%.QEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS78 Page 16
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